

Parliamentary Elections 2011-2012

**Report Summary of
Egyptian Alliance for Election Monitoring**



Egyptian Alliance for Election Monitoring

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Report Summary

Translated by:

Hend Khattab

Rami Sidky

This document is a translated summary for the official report issued by the Egyptian Alliance for Election Monitoring in Arabic language.

United Group

Parliamentary Elections 2011-2012 (Egyptian Coalition for Election Monitoring report)

Address: 26A, Sherif St. Immobilia Building, North Wing, 2nd Floor, Flat 239, 231, Cairo – Egypt.

Tel.: +202 239 26 907 – 239 61 732 – 239 61 726

Fax: +202 239 52 304

E-mail: info@ug-law.com

Website: www.ug-law.com

Publisher: United Group

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Dedication:

United Group dedicate this report to Dr. Saad Al-Din Ibrahim and the soul of Dr. Saied Al-Naggar who were the first to conduct an institutional process to monitor the elections in Egypt in 1995, under the name “National Committee for monitoring the elections” with the participation of a number of Egyptian public figures such as Dr. Milad Hanna and Mr. Nabil Al-Helaly.

United Group

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Background papers of this project were prepared by:

1. Mr. Ibrahim Ghaly, Researcher at the Middle East Research Center – Middle East News Agency “*The Supreme Council of Armed Forces, and the management of Egypt after the 1952’s revolution*”.
2. Mr. Hafez Abu Seada, *Attorney at Law and Chairman of Egyptian Organization for Human Rights*”.
3. Ali Abdel Al, Specialist in the Islamic movements’ affairs. “*Study of the Salafist*”.
4. Ali Mohammed Ali, Assistant researcher at Center for Political and Strategic Studies - Al-Ahram. “*Economic conditions in Egypt*”
5. Mr. Mohammed Ezz Al-Arab, Researcher at Center for Political and Strategic Studies - Al-Ahram. “*Protest movements*”.

6. Mr. Mahmoud Ibrahim, political science researcher. *“New Media”*.
7. Mr. Negad El-Borai, Attorney at law and director of United Group. *“Legal environment in which the elections were conducted”*.
8. Mr. Yasser Abdel Aziz, media expert. *“The condition of the Egyptian Media”*.
9. Dr. Yosry Al-Azabawy, expert at Center for Political and Strategic Studies - Al-Ahram. *“Political parties before and after the revolution”*.
10. Egyptian Organization for Human Rights: The final report on the Parliamentary Elections 2011 – 2012.
11. Andalus Institute for Tolerance and anti-Violence Studies: Media between the hammer of the neutrality and the anvil of the revolution.
12. The Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights: Elections monitoring report 2011-2012 from a qualitative perspective.

Coordinator of the working team:

Dr. Sobhy Eseila.

The printing and the review were supervised by:

Mr. Magdy Kamel Morad.

Scientific Consultant for the project:

Mr. Negad El-Borai
Attorney at law
Director of United Group

Prepared and edited by:

Mr. Abdel Ghafar Shokr
Vice President of the
Arabian and African
Research Center

The initial draft of the report was discussed by:

1. Mr. Ibrahim Ghaly, Middle East News Agency.
2. Mr. Ahmed Ismail Salah, students' official at Hefna.
3. Mr. Ahmed Abdel Hafez, Vice president of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights.
4. Mr. Islam Abdel Rahman Hashem, attorney at law and a member of the Egyptian Democratic Party.
5. Mr. Ehab Al-Kharat, member of Shoura Counsel.
6. Dr. Gamal Abdel Gawad, political science professor and the former director of Al-Ahram Center for political studies.
7. Ms. Gameila Ismail, media personnel and activist.
8. Mr. Hafez Abu Seada, Attorney at law and chairman of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights.
9. Mr. Hamdy Ibrahim, former police brigade.
10. Mr. Hamdy Rezk, Editor in chief of the photographer magazine.
11. Mr. Sad Hagra, Journalist at the World Today news paper.
12. Ms. Samar Al-Hussieny, Andalus Institute.
13. Dr. Sobhy Esela, researcher at Al-Ahram Center.
14. Mr. Abdel Ghafar Shokr, Vice president of Arabian and African Research Center.
15. Mr. Ali Abdel Al, researcher of the Islamic movements.
16. Mr. Emad Gad, member of the Parliament.
17. Mr. Amr Mohammed Zahran, member of the higher committee for the Construction and Development Party.
18. Mr. Mohammed Al-Shabah, Chief Editor of Egypt's renaissance.
19. Mr. Mohammed Shoman, Dean of the International Institute of Information.
20. Dr. Mohammed Al-Masry, Asr Egypt Center.
21. Mr. Mahmoud Ibrahim, researcher.
22. Mr. Mesbah Kotb, Journalist at Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper.
23. Dr. Mustafa Al-Naggar, member of the Parliament.
24. Mr. Montaser Al-Zayat, attorney at law.
25. Ms. Heba Ali, Andalus Institute.
26. Mr. Yasser Abdel Aziz, media expert.

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Abstract

This document is a translated summary for the official report issued by the Egyptian Alliance for Election Monitoring in Arabic language. The report includes an analysis of the Egyptian parliamentary elections 2011-2012 along with nine research studies on the environment in which the election process was conducted, in terms of the legal and judicial conditions as well as the role of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces, protest movements, political parties, economic conditions and the role of conventional and new media. Furthermore, a research study is dedicated to the “Salafist” movement, which is considered to be Egypt’s new political player that has suddenly appeared publicly prior to the election process and has significantly affected it. It is important to note that these research studies have contributed to the drafting of this report, not only in judging the first parliamentary elections after the 25th of January 2011, but also in analyzing the political, economic and legal environment in which the election process was conducted.

Egypt has witnessed two parliamentary elections in almost one year:

The first was in 2010: the elections were held under an authoritarian regime, where the executive authority was predominant over the legislative & judicial authorities as well as the entire society. And under a multi-party system based on the presence of a major party permanently dominating power next to a group of small parties that are not allowed to grow to the point in which they can compete

with it over power. As a result, the elections have witnessed harsh intervention from the security agencies in general and the State Security Agency (SSA) in particular. In addition to the clear biased behavior of the state media in favor of the candidates of the ruling party and many of the actions that led to prefabricated results, in which the ruling party candidates won more than 95% of the parliamentary seats and the opposition parties, including liberal, socialist and independent candidates got less than 5%.

The second time in 2011: the elections were held under a transitional revolutionary situation that followed the people's revolution of January 25, which overthrew of the head of the regime, prosecuted its main figures and successfully dissolved the ruling party and the SSA, thus widely opening the door for new political and partisan balances.

While the elections held in 2010 under the authoritarian regime has completely ignored the reality and embodied the will of the rulers in dominating the parliament, the elections held in 2011 under the current revolutionary transitional status, despite all the errors and violations, has sincerely expressed the reality of political and partisan statuses existing at the time and has reflected the will of the voters. It brought to the parliament new deputies representing the political Islamic trend by 70% of the seats and 30% of the seats for civil, liberal, socialist and nationalist movements. There is no doubt that identifying the conditions which ruled the elections in both times and the general framework of political, legal and media aspects under

which the elections were conducted, could help to identify the ingredients that will ensure fair parliamentary elections to secure the right of the Egyptian people to choose their rulers and change them periodically through their own free will, and also determine the conditions which should be available to carry out these elections in a climate of freedom and independence of the popular will.

The importance of this report comes from two major considerations; the first is our devotion in the Democratic Alliance to monitor the elections, and our adherence to the professional essence of our work apart from any political considerations. The work of civil society organizations is basically not political, even if it has political effects. The second consideration is related to our commitment to the goal that we share with most of the Egyptians, which is the goal of making a sustainable and solid democratic transformation in Egypt. We are aware that this goal will not be possible to achieve in a short period of time by one revolutionary jump or a single-sourced reform initiative. Hence, we value and support any action or development that would push the country to move forward on the path to democracy.

At the same time, our commitment to the democratic future of Egypt makes us alert to the signs that may pose a threat to this future, and that what we have observed as tendency of some entities to drag the parliamentary elections out of context and deal with the electoral outcome not to reflect the trends of public opinion and the balance of political powers in a specific moment, but to reflect a victory of some a defeat for others, including the use of electoral outcomes to arrange

long-term interests that violate the democratic principles. Democracy is not an exhibition of the products that we may buy to serve our desires, but it is an integrated infrastructure that entirely falls as some of its components are dropped.

Despite the shortcomings and violations, the 2011 parliamentary elections provided for the Egyptian citizen the opportunity of free expression, which he did not enjoy for decades without manipulation of his own will in choosing his representatives. And in fact, it is important to transmit this popular will that was expressed through the ballot box to the seats occupied by selected candidates in the Parliament, which certainly represents a major step forward on the path towards democracy. Although we have monitored various deficiencies and violations in this report, which distorts the bright side of the democracy; however, we estimate that they were not enough to substantially alter the final outcome of the elections, and they are certainly not enough to be used to justify any attempt of disarming the representativeness of the parliament resulting from the elections.

In order for this report to achieve its full aim, we will address the following basic elements:

1. The general framework in which the 2011 elections took place.
2. The electoral process in 2011 and its results.
3. The future of elections in Egypt (recommendations and suggestions).

Part I

The general framework in which the elections were conducted

As opposed to the 2010 elections, the 2011/2012 parliamentary elections were held amid extensive political, legal, economic and media developments brought by the revolution of January 25. These developments have formed the societal climate that surrounded the elections as the general framework that governed these elections and helped in determining relevant dimensions and the balance of power between parties of the political scene, which had a clear impact on the proceedings and the results of the electoral process.

The Egyptian revolution has opened the door for the rise of a mixture of three major forces.

First, the democratic force: it includes the political and social forces, which regard the democratic values as the major central constituent of their vision of the world and their perception of the future. They are the forces that included democracy in their programs as a main demand and are committed to civil liberties and citizenship rights, without concessions or reservations, as these democratic forces have suffered from the restrictions imposed by the former regime on political participation. Although its considerable presence among the elite political groups and urban residents, yet the democratic

force was unable to build bases of popular support that match the magnitude of its existence among the elite groups. The fall of the regime has eliminated the authoritarian obstacles that used to face this force and prevent them from communicating with the public and build convenient public support.

Second, the military: it stepped up to the front of the political scene as a result of the revolutionary protests that forced former President Mubarak to step down from power. After many years where the military had its known, yet not explicitly obvious share of power, the revolution has opened the way for it to occupy the frontline of the political scene. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) became responsible for ruling the country in the position of the President of the Republic, with Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi having a quasi-presidential status accompanied by the full authority bundle of the President of the Republic.

Third, the Islamic force: after the January 25 revolution, the door was wide open for the rise of Islamic forces. The revolution has resulted in the expansion of the Islamic scene, and gave it an additional measure of diversity and complexity after the Salafist movement entered the field of politics, something which it has long been refusing. Although the Islamic forces, particularly the Salafists, were the last in participating in the revolution and its groups, yet by all standards they were the revolution's top beneficiaries.

The Islamic current with its current formation has, at best, a deficient rationale of democracy. If we add this to the limited democratic credentials – if any – of the army, and to the apparent weakness of the liberal current, it could be argued that it is justified to express doubts about the ability of the Egyptian political community to take full advantage of the opportunity that it had obtained to build a real democratic political system on the ruins of a old system, which had collapsed in early 2011.

We will briefly discuss the general framework in which the elections were held, regarding the political, legal, media, and economic aspects, and its impact on the electoral process.

The political framework

The political framework in which the elections took place was formed by a new balance between various political forces represented by the SCAF, the revolutionary youth coalition, the political Islamic forces, and civil political parties with liberal, socialist and nationalist spectra.

The political openness that Egypt has witnessed after many years of political oppression during Mubarak's regime was monopolized by a narrow sect of the political spectrum, which confined the political power to itself, leaving other groups and opposition parties a very limited space to work in the political arena. This was not attractive to large segments of citizens who previously had the intention to participate in the political scene, and due to this

political infrastructure, most of the citizens chose to remain outside the political system, its institutions and processes.

The political situation taking shape since the fall of the former regime has contributed in solving the dilemma faced by the former regime for decades, which is the integration of political Islamic groups, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, in the Egyptian political system. While many of the rationalists have previously sought to expand the Egyptian political sphere in an attempt for a gradual and planned integration process that is commensurate with the size and importance of the Muslim Brotherhood and the political Islamic currents, the January 25 revolution has paved the way to resolve the issue of political Islam and the Egyptian political system in a revolutionary manner in what could be considered as one of the most important achievements that face the Egyptian political community.

Freeing the political scene has clearly shown the depth of the political Islamic phenomenon and its complexity, while the Egyptian intellectuals and politicians for many years have underestimated the issue of political Islam and restricted its manifestation to the Muslim Brotherhood. The political openness has allowed for the politicization of additional Islamic currents, specifically the Salafī current, which infused the phenomenon of political Islam with new dimensions, especially after the recent parliamentary elections.

While the new political situation grants the political Islamic groups an opportunity to show their vitality and depth, they also

provided a great opportunity to renew the currents of liberalism and socialism and the revolutionary protests have shown a new generation of liberals and socialists of Egyptians who had previously refrained from the political scene because of the restrictions imposed by the former regime, the deadlock status that has dominated the liberal parties, and also because of the distortion caused to the principles of liberalism by groups that worked within the political framework of the dissolved National Democratic Party, mixing up economic with political liberalism.

The elections have produced a range of new political parties that occupied the frontline of both sides of the political landscape, the majority and the minority, which appears to be their opportunity to remain upfront because they represent actual currents, forces and interests in the society. This is considered to be the first necessary step on the path to drag the Egyptian partisan system out of the stalemate position and the decorative status imposed on it for decades.

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and management of the transitional stage

The parliamentary elections were held under turbulent political circumstances caused by the nature of the transitional period, where the country comes out from the rule of a particular political system, seeking to build a new political system. These circumstances were also caused by the approach used by the SCAF in managing the transitional stage.

Since the SCAF came to power, it deliberately avoided any attempts to build a consensus with the various political forces. It was clear from the early beginning that the SCAF will be the most effective and influential political power in the country's post-Mubarak era. The way in which the SCAF managed the transitional stage has led to doubts and conflicts between different political forces in a way that seems as if the SCAF has intentionally created conflicts between these forces in an attempt to weaken them, in order to sustain its position as the most powerful political power in the country and to be able to direct the country according to its preference.

Regardless of the intentions of the SCAF and the goals that it has attempted to achieve, the overall approach by which it managed the country's affairs has put it in an extremely difficult political position, after the tremendous popular credibility that it had enjoyed during the beginning of the transitional period, which was unbeatable by any other political force at the time. After about a year of political transition, the SCAF's relations with various political and social groups has become very tense, including its relations with the revolutionary youth groups, liberals, leftists and Copts.

As for the forces of political Islam, despite the fact that they were trying to avoid sharp tensions in their relations with the SCAF, they have come to realize their own power, leading them to exert effective and well measured pressure on the SCAF, making use of the bustling pressure faced by the Council from the extreme revolutionary groups. The SCAF's management of the of the elections was a clear

example of its failure to achieve the required national consensus, considering the very late timing in determining the parliamentary elections, the multiple successive drafts of the electoral law, and the SCAF's reluctance to resolve the issue of Egyptian voters who are abroad, until it was finely resolved by a court decision.

The most important feature that characterized the performance of the SCAF is its double standards. As per its discourse, it has deviated from what it had promised in the beginning of the transitional period; to start the elections and the establishment of a democratic system and to hand over power to a democratically elected civilian regime. The SCAF acted in a manner that conveyed opposite directions, which led to growing mistrust between it and the political forces, increasing the difficulty of reaching a suitable approach to manage the transition process. The controversy over the election law is an additional example for the manifestation of these conflicts. At the end, the SCAF was forced to accept the bulk of demands of the political forces.

It could be argued that the approval of the election law, the independent authority of the SCAF in determining the political and constitutional future of the country may have been reduced to a large extent. Thereby, having no other alternatives in this stage but to rely on the Muslim Brotherhood, which seemed to be the least costly way to ensure that what can be achieved from the perceptions of the military leadership, particularly with regard to the status of the army in the Constitution and perhaps the issues concerning the role of the

army in the foreign policy and national security policies of the country as well.

As the SCAF was attempting to strengthen its relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, its relations with various civil groups was increasingly worsened. This justifies the frequent incidents of violence that took place in the country in the second half of the year and the unprecedented crackdown by the state against civil society institutions, as well as the way in which the parliamentary elections was managed.

Revolutionary youth groups

It is not possible to conduct an analysis of the Egyptian political forces without talking about the revolutionary youth groups. The rallies organized by these groups in January 2011 were the spark that ignited the massive protests that led to the fall of Mubarak's regime and opening the door for all the political developments covered in this report, including the election of parliament. A new generation of young revolutionaries started to appear in the Egyptian politics arena since the start of the new century. The 90's period was marked by the dormancy and disintegration of political movement, and the dominance of a state of fatigue and loss of ability to develop new methods of opposition among the political forces that existed actively in the previous decade.

However, by the emergence of the new century, the inability of the former regime to deal with emerging contradictions became very

clear, and signs of life began to appear again in Egyptian political scene, and with every step forward by the opposition protest movements, the features of a new generation of young revolutionaries started to take shape. Perhaps it is ironical that the birth of the Egyptian political movements and the new generation of young revolutionaries were not linked directly to the failures of the regime, but to external developments on which the regime had only an indirect influence at most. As there has been a wave of popular protests in support of the Palestinian uprising in 2000, where the Egyptian political movements had the opportunity to gather activists and dissidents, training a new generation of young revolutionaries in a new climate that accepts the idea of protesting, political participation, and the willing to criticize the political system and the regime. The U.S. invasion of Iraq came in 2003, to inflame the hearts of new young people and to encourage them to sustain the protests and gain experience in organizing demonstrations and confront security forces.

The years 2004-2008 witnessed a significant shift in the formation of this new generation of young revolutionaries. In December 2004 Kifaya movement was formed by a group of activists from the 70's generation, which has succeeded in becoming a center of attraction for the new young revolutionaries, who joined and participated in its activities, and established a number of young political movements that are similar to Kifaya under different names from terms and slogans of change which was brought forward by Kifaya.

In fact the establishment of the Al Ghad Party under the leadership of Ayman Nour in 2004 was considered as another area to attract young people to political action as part of Nour's nomination for presidency. The youth's political participation was also sustained by the establishment of the Democratic Front Party in 2005, which has also succeeded to attract a number of young liberal people.

Perhaps the year 2008 was the most decisive in the prominence of the young revolutionaries, where the 6th of April movement was founded in the wake of a successful labor strike in the city of Mahalla al-Kubra. The interesting fact here is that the liberal movement of young revolutionaries at this stage did not prevent them from representing and adopting the demands of the labor movement, which gave a new social dimension that was always absent in the Egyptian liberal movements, especially after the weakness of the New Wafd Party's popular base. Since then, the 6th of April movement had a key role in organizing the protests that occurred in subsequent years until the outbreak of the revolution.

However, the liberal component was not the only element in the new movement of young revolutionaries; there have been other components, such as leftist and Islamic. To the left of the young activists of Al Ghad Party, the Democratic Front Party, and the 6th of April Movement were some groups of left-wing activists who had gathered in various teams, most importantly the Revolutionary Socialists movement, which is a radical leftist movement that was founded several years ago. The leaders of the movement include

activists from different political generations, but the core is formed by young activists who were always at the forefront of the participants in various political opposition activities.

Generally, the revolutionary youth groups are characterized by a very high degree of energy, mobility and the will to struggle, which distinguished from the previous generations, in addition to their willingness to test new struggling methods. This fighting spirit and the ability to innovate have enabled these groups of young people to overthrow the regime at the end. Although the protest that was planned on January 25, 2011 did not aim to overthrow the regime, but the groups of young revolutionaries have planned it tightly and creatively to the point that it became the starting point of the developing events that led to the fall of the regime. Repeated attempts and constant innovation of struggling methods always would eventually produce great results, as long as deep structural defects remain in the system.

It seems that the young revolutionaries were motivated by their nature to sustain the revolutionary manner and refuse to work in the political institutional framework after the fall of the regime, because mobilization and protesting is the main source of their power. They refuse to abandon this method and resist attempts that push them to join the political institutions, as they realize and understand their negative impact on their ability to move things in a direction that is consistent with their visions. Perhaps the fragmentation and division among many of these groups is the most important factor that caused

the failure of the young revolutionaries in the adjustment and adaptation of their movement and their choices in accordance with the developments on the ground. Also due to the absence of clear prominent leadership formations that have the ability to bind the members of these movements and their supporters to their decisions, is an additional factor that did not help to empower the young revolutionary groups to act appropriately in a timely manner.

Another problem faced the youth movements, which is that their success to overthrow the Mubarak regime after years and perhaps a few months from their formation may have given these movements a high degree of self-confidence that reached the point of arrogance and they often believed in their ability to achieve any aimed goal, and in fact commitment and struggling were enough to achieve it. While this was sufficient for toppling Mubarak's regime, it does not seem to be sufficient to achieve the objectives of these movements in the post-revolution stage.

Groups of young activists were more concerned with eliminating the remnants of the former regime, while the other institutionalized political forces were engaged in building a new political system and secure their positions within. Before the end of the year (2011), the features of the new system were taking shape and apparently there was no obvious place for the young revolutionaries who, on the contrary, were persecuted due to accusations of involvement in violence, receiving funds from foreign entities without authorization, insulting the army, and dismantling the state.

The Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is a large organization that dates back to several decades, and since their public return to politics in the 70's, they were characterized by being very cautious and avoiding to get involved in open confrontations with the authorities, which is the most important lesson learned by the bitter experiences of the Muslim Brotherhood during its clash with the Nasser regime and the previous system as well. With the escalation of political protests in recent years, the Brotherhood developed a strategy to put them forward in each aspect, as they had almost permanent representatives in political protests to emphasize on their commitment to the opposition and staying by their side in the battles. However, the Brotherhood's participation in the protests was always much less than the level of its organizational and logistical capacity. The MB's strategy was not that distinct in the revolution of January 25, while some of the young enthusiasts of the MB have participated in the revolution, the MB's organization and leadership kept a distance away from it, only until they were sure of its success. Although the full story of the relationship of the MB with the revolution has not yet evolved, yet it is certain that the MB took part in the revolution on two stages. The first stage was limited to the participation of the MB's youth, whose relations with various other political currents were strengthened during the short period preceding the Revolution. In the next stage, the MB pushed a greater number of their members to participate in the revolution. This stage reached climax on the 2nd of February, in what

is known as “the camel battle”, and still the related secrets are yet to be revealed.

The MB has realized, since January 25, that a major change has occurred in Egypt, and that a minimum level of benefits has been gained, which is a level that gives them recognition as a political force enjoying legitimacy. The MB’s participation in the mass demonstrations of Tuesday the 8th of February, which wiped out any hope for reaching a compromise in the persistent political crisis, was the approach chosen by the MB to maximize its gains in the country’s new political phase.

The MB was the fastest political group in transitional stage to consider their political future, and their approach in dealing with the elimination of the remnants of the previous regime has only been within the limits of what serves their future, which was the most important feature of MB’s policy at some point after the fall of the policies pursued by most of the other political groups, especially the young revolutionaries. The MB realized that the army has become the new master in the Egyptian politics, and that maximizing its gains of in this new stage requires the development of a working relationship with the new rulers, which coincided with the MB’s interest in seeking a civil partner that could help them penetrate the popular coalition that overthrew Mubarak’s regime.

The MB realized the value of the gains that was obtained from the revolutionary developments and their emerging relationship with

the army, and chose to work towards what they considered as appropriate, even if it is on the account of the disintegration of the broad revolutionary coalition that toppled Mubarak's regime. The coalition was fragile and was formed coincidentally rather than being the result of an explicit contractual agreement between various groups having shared interests, which allowed the brothers to act freely without feeling that they are breaking the any promises they might have made. The separation between the MB and other forces that participated in the revolution started with their position regarding the referendum of the constitutional amendments prepared by the legislative committee, which was attended by an MB representative. The MB stood behind the amendments with all their strength, while their previous allies from civil political forces took the opposite in the 19th of March referendum, a fact which became the corner stone in the wall of the deep mistrust that dominated the relationship between the MB and civil political forces throughout the remainder of the year.

The establishment of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) was a natural political development for the MB after the revolution. The decision of the party's establishment was largely revolutionary because this was the first time in which the MB attempted to form a political party that is distinguished from its image, which was directly linked to the political opposition along with Islamic advocacy. It is worth noting that FJP was not founded in a regime in the authority seeks to integrate the MB in the legitimate political process, but rather under a weak and temporary military authority, and during a few

months in which the MB was preparing to occupy the frontline of the Egyptian political scene.

Due to these circumstances, the birth of FJP was incomplete, and its independence from the parent group (the MB) was not allowed amid a climate of ambiguity in identifying any objective dimension for the relationship between them. The MB selected the leaders of the party, and assigned its members, a fact that proves that founding the FJP is nothing more than a formality intended to circumvent the requirements of the law in order to work in politics. Perhaps the most surprising fact in this regard is that the FJP enjoys the legal legitimacy since its establishment in June 2011 was approved, while the legal status of the MB is still undetermined.

The political performance of the MB in the post-revolution period marked very significant features, most importantly the transmission of the MB's policy from political caution and anticipation to political expansion, where it seeks to expand and fill political gaps whenever available.

The Salafist Movement

The Egyptian society was surprised by the involvement of the Salafists and their rise in the political scene after the January 25 revolution, and their great success in the 2011 parliamentary elections. The first signs of the renewal of the Salafi ideology appeared in the modern era during late 19th century by a number of senior scholars and modernists who worked on the revival of Salafist thought and its

dissemination. However, the Salafi movement was not converted to a political force that involves a wide range of preachers and scholars, and thousands of young people except in the early 70's with the advent of the Salafist advocacy group (School of Alexandria) between the years 1972 & 1977 by a group of religious students and members of the Islamic Group in Alexandria who refused to join the MB and had strong relations with the scholars of the Saudi Salafist movement during travels of Hajj and Umrah.

The Salafists' political position and its developments

The Salafists have never participated in any political action in Egypt before the January 25 revolution, but they had a sharp position not to approach any political involvement or entitlement in the country. Once the Jan 25 revolution took place, creating radical variables in the society and changing the balance of powers, the Salafists found that the conditions are ripe enough to the extent that permitted them to a reasonable space for active participation. On the 22nd of March, 2011 the Salafist movement announced an unprecedented statement, declaring its formal involvement in the political process. The Salafists said that they have fully accepted the mechanism of democracy that satisfies the Egyptian people now as means of governing the various political forces in the political practice. However, their view on democracy remained the same as it was in the past, not regarding the ideology of democracy, being the theory that governs the political process, but rather the philosophy of democracy, where people are the primary source of legislative power,

while they believe that “the power and the authority are only God’s practice”.

Al Noor Party

Following the Jan 25 revolution, a group of young intellectuals and enthusiasts from various professional and technical backgrounds, who are affiliated with the Salafist advocacy, established Al Noor Party and worked quickly with the support of the religious scholars of Alexandria to strengthen their publicity and educate people about it through a large number of conferences that were lodged in almost all the regions in Egypt, until it became the strongest party of all the Salafist parties. In the 2011 parliamentary elections, Al Noor Party led the Salafist-dominated “Islamic alliance” after it left the "Democratic Alliance”, which was founded by the FJP along with a number of other parties.

Other Salafist parties were established as well, such as Al Asala Party, which is one of the biggest Islamist parties that are in favor of dialogue, understanding and alliance between all Islamic spectra, the Construction and Development Party, which is the representative of the Islamic Group, and Al Fadila Party, which is the third political party that emerged from the Salafist movement after Al Noor and Al Asala parties. Al Fadila Party calls for a civil state with an Islamic reference and it seeks to achieve justice and equality among people and regain Egypt’s prominence in various fields, in addition to accepting membership of Copts. There is also Al Islah Party, which

has recently announced the integration with the "Islamic Youth Front", as a confirmation of the interest within the party cadres to push the country's youth forward.

Neo-liberal parties

The revolution has revealed the depth of the liberalist and left-wing political currents that were unknown before the revolution, while the Egyptian political arena had seemed to be split between the National Democratic Party and the Muslim Brotherhood as well as relatively small groups of liberal and leftist intellectuals and activists with limited influence. The revolution has shown the significant presence and depth of the non-Islamic streams in the political scene, and has also shown the ability of these currents to gather, mobilize and organize masses, although their fragmentation and lack of leadership were very apparent during the post-revolution period, which disrupted the ability of these currents in effective political influence, especially that a large proportion of the activists affiliated with these currents still resist the idea of working through political parties and institutions, and prefer to work through less controlled organizational frameworks, in addition to their belief that it is not the time for the conversion to the stage of political institutionalization and the abandonment revolutionary protests.

The Free Egyptians Party and the Egyptian Social Democratic Party are the most prominent liberal parties that came out of the revolution, while the Free Egyptians Party tends to be on the centre-

right and the Egyptian Social Democratic Party tends to be on the centre-left. The Free Egyptians Party was founded at the initiative of Egyptian businessman Naguib Sawiris, where it adopts secular principles and free market economy. On the other hand, the Egyptian Social Democratic Party was founded at the initiative of a group of democracy activists with left-wing backgrounds, who converted from conventional left-wing ideologies to trends that are based on the ideas of democratic socialism. While the Egyptian Social Democratic Party adopts secular principles, in the same way as the Free Egyptians Party, its understanding of the market economy focuses on the social role of the state and the need for effective intervention in order to ensure more equal distribution of wealth, because this cannot be achieved by the market mechanisms alone.

Both parties enjoy great support from Copts, especially the Free Egyptians Party, which was presented with an image of an objective equalizer to the Islamic parties. While the Coptic support of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party is considered to be a big privilege that guarantees the affiliation of a complete sect of the Egyptian population with it, yet it is a fact that decreases its attractiveness to the Muslim voters. On the other hand, the Egyptian Social Democratic Party seems to be able to attract several sects of the Egyptian population, although its popular base has not taken shape in consistently yet.

The leaders of both parties did well when they realized that there are a lot of similarities and common goals between them, and decided

to contest in the elections through the alliance they have founded, which is called “The Egyptian Bloc”. The alliance has also included the membership of Al Tajamoa Party, which emerged from the moment of birth of the Egyptian parties after 1952, specifically since 1976. While Al Tajamoa Party for many years was the largest party of the Egyptian left-wing current, its focus in the recent years was to resist the rise of political Islam, which has lightened its leftist nature and emphasized on its secular nature. Although the party members are still advocates of socialist ideas which have experienced a lot of changes over the past years, yet their strong secular orientation made them closer to the liberal parties with which they have shared alliance in the framework of the Egyptian Bloc.

AL Wafd Party

Al-Wafd and Al-Tajamoa are the parties that were able to cross from the restricted pluralism phase to the open-party system after the revolution, meanwhile all the other parties were about to disappear except the Democratic Peace Party that a number of its candidates were able to become members in the Parliament.

Al-Wafd Party is considered the oldest among all these parties, as it was established before the restricted pluralism phase, and it was number one in Egypt in the period between 1919 and 1952. And it represents the moderate national liberal current which is an authentic current in the Egyptian politics, and although Al-Wafd Party shares some ideologies with the neo-liberal parties, but many citizens

especially in the countryside in Egypt are supporting it and this made it less elitist than the neo-liberal parties.

The history of Al Wafd party, the ideologies it represents and being supported by citizens in the countryside all these factors made it a significant political party which can play an important role in creating the Egyptian political future, as it is considered as a suitable alternative choice for many voters who want to support a suitable moderate political current rather than the Islamic and the neo-liberal currents.

However, the political performance of Al-Wafd Party did not allow it to benefit from its position and also from the support of its wide range of supporters. And although Al-Wafd party came in the third place after Freedom and Justice party (the Muslim brotherhood political wing) and Al-Noor party in the parliamentary elections, but many people knew that if the political performance of Al-Wafd was better it could do better than the third place especially after showing the results of the surveys that were conducted before the elections which stated that Al-Wafd party will be a powerful competitor before the Muslim brotherhood, and the reason why Al-Wafd did not succeed was because it didn't make enough effort to reach the voters, and maybe this was caused by it depended on television advertising which came as a compensation for the defects in organizing electoral campaigns which the party suffered from in the last years due to the restriction imposed by the previous regime and the conflicts within the party.

To reach many voters, every party needs many activists, and also needs a powerful organizing team to face the large number of the supporters and activists and Al-Wafd suffers from defects in these areas during this phase. Leaders of Al-Wafd party tried to keep it in an advanced position in the Egyptian political life by some ways that are not always helpful in empowering the influence of the party and increasing the numbers of its supporters, as those leaders used to nominate the former national party supporters on the party's lists which created conflicts within the party and led to dissent of some of its activists and members, they also sometimes conducted agreements that harm the image of the party in the eyes of its supporters such as their attempt to form a Democratic Alliance with the Muslim brotherhood and also the connections between it and the Supreme Counsel of Armed Forces which was suppose to be important for empowering the party's image in front of its supporters, but this kind of agreements made a positive impact for a short time but then these agreements harmed the party and its ability to establish a powerful base of supporters which the party will need in the coming phases.

Socialist parties and movements

Socialist parties and movements have won from the 25th of January revolution after years in which the Socialist movements in Al-Tajamoa party in addition to some other small movements were frozen. The period before the revolution witnessed increased conflicts inside the leftist party (Al-Tajamoa) between two wings, one of them was sticking to a leftist ideologists in the struggle against the old

regime and while the other one followed a moderate policy which was compatible with the old regime on many issues especially these issues in regard with the position towards the religious movements.

The revolution and its consequences such as removing the restrictions on the formation of political parties allowed the leftist movement inside Al-Tajamaa party and outside it to form parties such as “Popular Coalition Socialist Party” which was formed by a group of former leader and members of Al-Tajamaa party, and also Egyptian Socialist and Socialist Labor Parties were suppose to be formed but Popular Coalition Socialist Party was the only one which was able to fulfill the conditions -which were listed in the political parties law- and form the party in the middle of October just before the parliamentary elections, and that reflects the obstacles faced by other socialist parties in completing registration conditions and the obstacles which the socialist ideas are facing in general, and most likely after passing the current phase of political pluralism practice and religious and secular polarization the idea of socialism will be more accepted among voters especially with establishing and developing independent trade unions that will be able to spread the ideas of socialism.

Candidates from Popular Coalition Socialist Party entered the race of the parliamentary elections among Al-sawra mostamera’s list which included a number of parties that did not had a license to start practicing their activities which are:

- Egyptian trend parties, which was established by some youth dissident from Muslim brotherhood.
- Coalition of the revolution's youth.
- Masr Al-Horrya liberal party.
- Egyptian socialist party.
- Equality and development party, which is a party with socialist backgrounds and stressing on ensuring women rights.

All these parties and movements share the same concept that the revolution did not end yet, the continuation of the fight against the former regime is a very important issue, and building new political and social relations is the right sign indicating the victory of the revolution, these ideas are similar to what the revolutionary youth groups believe in, but what makes the movements and parties -that were included in Al-Sawra Mostamera's list special is their belief that participation in building the new political system organizations is a very important issue in addition to the continuation of struggling against the former regime. Al-Sawra Mostamera's list is considered as a successful trial of the electoral coalitions.

Al-Wasat Party (Centre Party):

The revolution allowed Al-Wasat Party to win legal legitimacy after years of struggling, and this party is seeking the support of the citizens who are looking for candidates representing the area between seculars and Islamists, but the success of Muslim brotherhood party to

represent itself as moderate Islamic party affected the ability of Al-Wasat Party to reach the voters who were ready to accept its ideas.

Political Parties that emerged from the former National Party:

After dissolving the national party, seven parties were formed with the assist of the activists in the former national party, but most of the leaders of the national parties disappeared.

Four of these parties succeeded in entering the Parliament represented in 17 seats only. And these parties represent moderate social trends and refused to adopt the ideologies of the neo-liberal and Islamic parties, and they all agree on the idea of forming a central powerful state that works in favor of the common social interest.

Construction and Development Party:

Construction and Development Party shares the same vision with the parties that emerged from the former national party in regard with the nature of the state and the general system, but it defers from these parties in the nature of its leaders as they are playing the role of reformist oppositionists and didn't disagree with the ideologies of the former regime.

Legal Framework

Legal environment of the elections

The legal framework that the parliamentary elections was performed under in 2011 is a new framework on many levels, the first

level is drastically changing the election system and another level was performing the elections in an open party system, but the only problem was the inequality of experience and resources between rivals, and on a third level the entity responsible for overseeing the elections was completely reshaped thus putting all the documents in the hands of the judicial committee with the title of High election committee.

On another level, and after a long ban, the government approved international monitoring of the elections by international NGOs with accordance to set guidelines, as such the elections were monitored by American and European NGOs.

A new Electoral system

After the revolution of the 25th of January a new electoral system was put up merging between the relative list on two thirds of the seats and individuals on one third of them, with women included in each of the relative lists.

High election committee: A head without a body

The high election committee, formed completely of judges, was tasked to oversee the election process from the beginning of forming nomination lists until the results are released, with accordance to election law. Voting and counting votes was performed under judicial oversight.

Legal situation of political parties and the decreasing of the nominee's age, and cancellation of women seats

The election process was performed in an environment of extended party rivalry, as 40 political parties were formed and this does not include parties that existed before the revolution. The election process also decreased the age of the nominee to become 25 years for the parliamentary elections and 35 years for the Shura elections, and canceled the seats reserved for women but forced them to include 1 woman at least in the relative lists.

Egyptians abroad: neglected voices

The legislative structure introduced for the first time the ability for Egyptians abroad to vote, and extended that circle by including all Egyptians registered in the National ID database to unify, for the first time, voter lists and cancelling the registration system.

A new Electoral system and increasing seats

After the new electoral system was in place, the number of parliament members became 498 members, half of which are workers and farmers.

Media Framework

Developments on the media scene in 2010-2011

Inflation in the number of platforms

The Egyptian media is witnessing an unprecedented state of fluidity and inflation in several platforms, highlighted after the revolution of 25th of January; several weeks after the fall of Mubarak, several new satellite channels were launched and a number of published and electronic newspapers, the content of the platforms has also changed to suit the new stage in Egypt after the revolution.

Problems with freedoms: Although media platforms increased, the Egyptian media faced new obstacles. One of these obstacles is represented in the refusal of the Military council to be criticized publicly in the media.

State owned media: Many media personnel and monitors in Egypt see that the revolution did not reach the state owned media, and that State television and newspapers are similar to what they were before the revolution, even though there were attempts to change these policies. Some accuse the state owned media of attempting to control the revolution and aborting it, gaining the description “counter revolution”.

Pressuring private media:

The Supreme council did not interfere in state owned media only, but there are several indicators that private media was pressured as well.

As such, general media framework under the last elections had the following attributes:

1. The unprecedented extension of the Egyptian media system, which covered the parliamentary elections 2011-2012 on a number of platforms.
2. The absence of authoritarian polarization to influence state owned media for the benefit of a certain party, as the executive authority was not taking part in the elections.
3. Highlighting the role of new media, and the increase of its users, and its impact.
4. Increase of interest in politics by the general public, and thus an increase in the coverage of the elections.
5. Relative integrity of the process increased demand for media exposure.
6. Interest of most media platforms in allocating a lot of funds for covering the elections, and spreading reporters across the country for extended coverage of all three stages, as well as establishing analysis studios.
7. Positive role of NGOs in evaluating and monitoring media coverage.
8. Positive role of the Ministry of Information in evaluating coverage and restricting bias and errors in coverage.
9. Increase in critique by media personnel and spectators with regards to unbalanced coverage.

Economic Framework

Security, economy and categorical protests

The elections were debatable, as it was performed under not only a strict legal and media framework, but also under a loose security situation and a declining economy. These factors affected voter trends, as the larger number of voters were tired from the lack of security and worsening economy, and the rise in categorical protests that created a sense of instability that makes it harder for the regular citizen to feel safe or for the economy to recover.

All these feelings led to the voter viewing elections not just as a political and ideological rivalry, but also as a means to bring about stability to the country. Under these conditions, the voter will lean towards movements that bring about peace and stability through what they perceive as order and organization of these movements. In the climate of instability and economic decline, it's harder for voters to choose liberal ideals, which was reflected in the results of the parliamentary elections.

Part II

The election process - participating entities and results

The performance of the Supreme Judicial Committee for Elections

Reports of NGOs that monitored the elections, as well as what was published in media concerning the election process, point to the fact that the performance of the electoral committee was lacking in managing the election process, and could not perform its monitoring role as permitted by the law of political rights, as well as falling in a number of faults and not fixing the problems that occurred in the election process in a suitable time, in addition to not having enough resources to face the violations by the nominees and their supporters.

The committee was not ready to manage the election process, and several factors contributed to this including:

- Lack of private premises for the election committees in the governorates.
- The lack of functional commissions for the high committee and electoral committees to perform their responsibilities and follow up on the election process.
- The high commission was not familiar enough with the locations of the headquarters; as such judges had a hard time identifying these headquarters in a timely manner.

- The absence of networking between the high election commission and election commissions in governorates to help with instant coordination for solving several urgent problems or take decisions in a timely manner with regards to complaints.
- The high election commission had no prior experience with elections, and hasn't enough knowledge with the electoral law.

The map of Candidates' Performance and Electoral Coalitions:

Partisan and political situation that affect the formation of electoral coalitions:

The reason why the parties may enter the electoral coalitions shall be found in the map-party, in which more than sixty political parties are included and these parties vary in their human, political and financial abilities, and some of these parties are recently-formed and did not have an adequate opportunity to present itself to citizens and there is no equality of opportunities between the parties in the electoral competition.

The electoral factors and the different conditions of the political parties were not the only things that influenced the formation of electoral coalitions, but the community circumstances which originated in the context of the revolution of 25th of January and the situation that were imposed by the political development such as holding the parliamentary elections before writing the new constitution and the new parliament with the Shoura Counsel were

assigned to form the Committee Drafting the Constitution, and this had its powerful impact on the formation of coalitions in order to have an influential role in the formation of the Committee Drafting the Constitution and hence in the drafting of the Constitution. The conflict between these electoral coalitions revolves mainly around the new constitution and its articles that will determine the nature of the state, the identity of the political system, the relationship between citizens and the state and the rights and freedoms of the citizens.

Map of the Electoral Coalitions:

1. Democratic coalition:

The Freedom and Justice Party, the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Wafd Party made an invitation to form an electoral coalition and to have a common list, 43 parties responded to this invitation, and the participants decided to form three committees, the first will prepare a draft bill on parliamentary election law, the second will work on election coordination, and the third committee will receive the notes, and during the meeting of these parties a paper entitled by (The National Alliance Initiative towards Forming Government of National Unity) was presented, most of the participants were from the small parties which aims to win seats in the parliament.

Conflicts between the parties within the coalition increased due to the inability to reconcile the wishes of the parties participating in the coalition, and on the first of October Al-

Wafd Party announced that it has left the coalition, because Muslim Brotherhood wanted to give Freedom and Justice party and Al-Wafd party 35% of the parliament seats which leaves only 30% for the other parties that were more than 40 parties, and then other parties followed Al-wafd party, so the coalition remained with only 12 parties.

2. Egyptian Bloc coalition:

This coalition was formed by Free Egyptian Party and Egyptian Social Democratic Party, it included the most of the civil parties and its program was build on constructing a civil state, and it was facing the Democratic Coalitions, led by the Muslim Brotherhood.

The parties joined this coalition reached fifteen parties, and the electoral coordination committee included representatives of these parties, and attempts were made to expand the coalition to include the alliance of the revolution's youth and Al-Nahda Party (with Islamic background) to reduce the secular polarization which accompanied the formation of the Egyptian bloc coalition and to be able to face the democratic coalition. And this attempts did not succeed due to the insistence of the leaders of the Free Egyptian Party and the Egyptian Social Democratic Party on not changing the name of the coalition to "continuation of the revolution" which was suggested by the youth, and at the same time, conflicts aroused on the arrangement of the lists, as well as on the inclusion of the names of some leaders of the former National Party (remnants)

in the lists, and then the People's Alliance Party announced that it left the coalition, and other participants followed the People's Alliance Party, leaving only three parties that nominations were distributed among them by 50% for the Free Egyptian Party, 40% for the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, 10% for Al-Tajamaa party, the National Progressive Party.

3. Al-Sawra Mostamera coalition:

When the People's Alliance Socialist Party left the Egyptian bloc alliance, a decision to form a new electoral coalition was made, this new coalition included the revolution's youth, Masr Al-Horriya Party, Equality and Development Party, Egyptian Socialist Party and the Egyptian Socialist Party.

The coalition presented a model for a wide national alliance includes Socialist, Liberal and Islamist parties in addition to revolution's youth alliance and all these parties were formed after the 25th of January revolution. The coalition tried to make Al-Nahdah and Al-Hadara parties (Islamic backgrounds) and Al-Karama Party (Nasserite background) to join but it failed, the program of this coalition was all about achieving the 25th of Jan. revolution's goals.

4. Salafist Parties coalition (Al-Noor Party):

All the Salafist parties left the Democratic Coalition because they refused the names of the candidates that were nominated by the Coordination Committee and their position on the list, as the Construction and Development Party has presented 100

candidates and only 20 were selected and they were placed in a late order and also Al-Asalah party left the coalition because only two parliament's seats were allocated to it. The coalition of the Salafist parties was formed few days before announcing the nomination for the elections, Al-Noor Party succeeded to make Al-Asalah and Construction and development Party join the coalition after failing to make other parties join such as Al-Tawhed Al-Araby, Labor and Al-Wasat parties. The criteria for choosing the candidates on this coalition's list was his/her believe that Islamic Shariaa is the only reference and that he/she never worked with the former national party, and also they must be one of those who were involved in political actions or social actions, and must be detached from personal or partisan interests, and lastly they must have a good reputation and to promise to work hard in serving the Egyptian citizens.

5. Coalitions that has not been completed:

Efforts were made to form a coalition that includes all the centrist parties such as the Al-Wasat, Al-Adl, Al-Hadarah and Al-Nahda Parties, but these efforts did not succeed.

Efforts were also made in order to form a Nasserist electoral coalition includes all the Nasserist parties but these efforts did not succeed as well.

The marginalization of electoral programs throughout the coalition building process

Despite the interest of electoral coalitions in preparing integrated electoral programs that cover all the main issues in the society and despite their interest in focusing on the issues that are strongly related with popular demands, such as social equality, yet the behavior of these coalitions and the involved parties during the electoral competition did not reflect sufficient concern with their political programs, instead they were marginalized and more attention was paid to direct contact with the people. Islamic parties, such as FJP, Al Noor Party and others, have utilized the religious element in their publicity campaign, and the Egyptian Bloc parties have made use of the Coptic support. FJP candidates, in particular, have benefited from the social services that had previously been offered by the MB to the citizens, in order to mobilize support and gather votes. All the candidates from all coalitions have resorted to familial fanaticism and have used bribes in a broad sense and in various forms during the elections. The electoral campaigns on TV channels were limited to general slogans that addressed the people's aspirations for a better life, without presenting certain procedures to achieve the content of these slogans.

The voters' performance and voting patterns

Egypt witnessed the first free parliamentary elections in 60 years, where the state agencies were did not interfere in the process.

As these elections represent Egypt's first step towards democratic development after the Jan 25 revolution, it is important that these elections are subjected to objective analysis and evaluation to extract the necessary lessons that should be learned in order to surround the future elections with all the guarantees and conditions that secure their fairness and credible representation of the people's will. It is very important, in this context, to analyze the voting behavior and patterns, and the economic, political, social, cultural and educational factors that affect this behavior. This requires the introduction of the electorate and its details.

First: The electorate

The electorate consists of 50 million citizens, who are divided into several segments that reflect various economic, social and cultural conditions in the society. They also reflect the contradictions in the society and related social and political conflicts that are governed by different class interests, cultural visions and political affiliations. By a quick analysis of the electorate database, it appears to be divided into the following segments:

1. **Illiterates:** More than 40% of the total voters in Egypt didn't have any political culture to enable them to trade-off between the candidates on the basis of their political programs, personal competence or political achievements. They often choose the candidate who provides them with direct services, or belongs to their village, or on the advice of relatives or acquaintances.

2. **Housewives:** This segment largely overlaps with the illiterates segment, where a large proportion of housewives don't master reading and writing, and have no role outside the family, nor do they have any interest or participation in public work or public issues, and they sometimes don't have the possibility or the ability to independently choose the candidates.
3. **Youth:** A very diverse segment, gathering in their ranks a sector that is not interested in public or social work, being busy managing the everyday needs of life. And there is another sector of young people, including students of secondary schools, universities, graduates, new employees and young workers, which is the segment of the educated youth who is most capable of playing a key role in the electoral process.
4. **Employed Adults:** This segment includes workers, employees, artisans and professionals who mostly watch what is going on in the community, including events, conflicts, community issues and problems, all of which they would normally despise. They have the ability to participate in the elections and the select the candidates they prefer.
5. **Marginalized People:** This segment includes very diverse sectors that operate outside the formal economy usually with no permanent jobs. They consider the elections as a profitable season to make money out of selling their votes for candidates.
6. **Business Owners (Entrepreneurs):** Whether small, medium or prominent business men & women, as well as various traders

whose capital interests dictate their choice of a particular candidate against another.

7. **Copts:** They boycotted the elections due to the community situations imposed on them, and the frustration they felt for the failure of their candidates in achieving a considerable victory in these elections.

Second: The basic phenomena of the voting process

The follow-up of the parliament elections 2011 and the resulting outcomes confirm that voting in these elections was not random, but is governed by conditions of the economic, social and cultural rights of voters and the prevailing community conflicts. This can be proved by reviewing the most important phenomena revealed by the process of voting in these elections and the consequent results.

1st phenomenon: The high rates of voting in the first round and their decline in the repetition:

27 million citizens have participated in the three stages of the parliamentary elections, representing more than half of the electorate, where these elections witnessed the highest rate of voting participation for many years. This happened both in villages and urban regions; however, the latter has witnessed a remarkable and significant increase in rates of participation, as they did not exceed 10% in the past elections at best, because urban residents are more aware and educated, and the middle class is more prominent. They did not have enough confidence in the integrity of the elections, but they

participated in the 2011 parliamentary elections at a high rate that exceeded 50% of the total electorate.

The high rates of participation across the country in general and in the major cities in particular, were due to several key factors, including:

- The Jan 25 revolution has attracted a large segment of citizens to the public work arena and the general interest in community issues and problems, who were characterized by negativity and used to boycott the elections for integrity concerns.
- The intensification of electoral competition, whether in the election lists, where nearly a hundred parties have participated or in the individual election system, where nearly than one hundred candidates or more were nominated for running for the individual system. This has helped in the participation of a large number of supporters of candidates running for lists as well as the individual system.
- The Interest of all types of media in covering the elections and familiarizing citizens with the candidates and their electoral programs.
- The fear of getting charged with the 500 pound-fine for failing to participate in the election, which justifies the participation of large a number of citizens who do not have sufficient knowledge about the candidates and are not interested in public affairs.

Despite the high rates of participation in the first round of the elections, a significant decrease in these rates were witnessed in the repetition stage, either for electoral lists or individual, where not more than 25% of the electorate was involved.

2nd phenomenon: Religion and its dominance in the society:

The voting process has revealed that the phenomenon of the growing tendency of religiosity has dominated the whole Egyptian society, without distinction between the urban population, the rural population and the desert population (Bedouins), as it was equally spread among all segments of society. This confirms the fact that political parties with religious background won the first and the second stages of the elections in all the circuits all over Egypt.

3rd phenomenon: The ability of religious currents to mobilize voters:

The vote indicators in all the voting circuits confirm the ability of political parties with religious background to mobilize voters, both in the first round in each stage, or in the repetition stage.

4th phenomenon: The vote on identity:

The religious parties Succeeded in providing the elections with a sectarian dimension when they spread the rumors about the church giving directives to the Coptic community to vote for the Egyptian Bloc alliance.

5th phenomenon: Organizing overcomes the tribal behavior in the individual circuits:

Combining the electoral lists with the individual system led to widening the individual circuits to become three times the size of the traditional individual circuits in the previous elections, where the circuits within the administrative center in the rural regions or the administrative section in the urban regions. And members of large and famous families in the rural areas used to win due to familial fanaticism, but the widening of individual circuits has prevented voting behavior that is based on tribal and familial fanaticism to a high extent.

While the MB has strong organizational skills that allowed it to cover the top three circuits together, which gave them the advantage and influence all over the big circuit, the same feature was possessed by the Salafist movement due to the presence of ties linking them to each other along the circuit. Hence the election results came to reflect this fact, as the MB and the Salafists won the great majority of the seats in the individual circuits all over Egypt, and the organization factor prevailed over the familial or the tribal factor.

6th phenomenon: The presence of fanaticism in urban areas as well:

Although the familial and tribal fanaticism is mainly found in rural areas, yet it had been transferred to the urban areas with the migration of rural people to big cities like Cairo, Alexandria and Suez,

where these immigrants reside in certain neighborhoods. Links and relations have grown between the members of these rural families in the context of affiliation with particular governorates, as the case for the people of the Qena, Sohag and Menoufia in the South of Cairo, such as Helwan, Basateen, and Old Cairo. The same phenomenon is applied on parts of other cities and migration from rural areas has led to their deprivation of being entirely dominated by urban values of modern civilization, where the primary loyalties to family and religion would be replaced by secondary loyalties, such as social class and political party. There is no doubt that this phenomenon disrupts the democratic development of the Egyptian society.

7th phenomenon: The good reputation always wins:

Although the basic rule of the latest parliamentary elections is the victory of candidates who possess stronger organizational capacities to cover all parts of the circuit; however, there were exceptions to this rule, which is that the candidate who has a history of struggle and enjoys high credibility and good reputation in the society can win over a candidate who belongs to a big and strong organization.

8th phenomenon: The absence of depending on the political programs of the individual candidates and candidates on the lists during the voting process:

Demanding the list system in the parliamentary elections was based on believing that this system will empower the multi-party

system in Egypt and politicizes the election, and many parties, coalitions and individual candidates who were participating in the elections represented an electoral program, and many press conferences were conducted in which the parties and candidates were defending their programs, despite that the voting process was not based on comparing the programs but most of the voters voted to the religious identity that was used by parties with Islamic background in their campaigns.

9th phenomenon: Modern values won in the cities:

Although this elections witnessed many mistakes and negative phenomenon, but it showed an example that expressed our hopes for the coming elections in Egypt, and although this example is limited to small areas in Cairo in which liberal candidates were selected instead of candidates from the Islamic current, and this small example shows a hope that democratic elections can be conducted in the future after getting rid of the rural values that crawled to major cities with the migration of people from the countryside, and this example is also very important for democratic development future in Egypt.

10th phenomenon: The confused voter voted by chance:

Confused voters represent the major part of voters in Egypt with a percentage exceeds 50% of voters, which their educational, social and cultural levels prevented them from choosing the candidates independently away from the impact of their families or neighbors. People who were advertising for their candidates in front of the voting

committees succeeded to direct this kind of voters to vote for their candidates, so the confused voters chose the candidates that were presented to them by the last person they talked with before entering the voting committee.

11th Phenomenon: Egyptians abroad voting in the last minute:

Egyptian authorities and Supreme Committee for Election hesitated in approving on the decision that allows the Egyptians abroad to vote although it is their constitutional right, and the decision was made in the last minutes, and although the number of the Egyptians abroad exceeds 10 million person, only more than 100.000 citizens voted in the elections, and this is a very small percentage of the Egyptians abroad that were devoted from voting which is considered a huge lose for the Egyptian society.

The media performance in the elections:

The elections were conducted in a stage that witnessed the greatest expansion ever known in the media in the history of Egypt, due to the large increase in the media means that already present or the other means that appeared after the 25th of Jan. revolution, and the elections were also conducted in the age of “new media”, many researcher saw that the new media became effective in the Egyptian youth political movements through the last years, other researchers saw that the impact of the new media appeared clearly in the electronic campaigns that were launched on the internet. This election also benefited from the neutral media coverage due to the absence of

the power that was forced on the media by the former national party for the first time.

The media coverage of the elections also was characterized by conducting many events to monitor and cover the election, so after the media was used to focus on 5 or 6 main parties, now it is suppose to cover the news of 59 different parties and more than 8000 independent candidates, and the similarities in the names of the political parties made the coverage more difficult and increased the confusions and require more accuracy.

Professional errors in regard with the direct coverage of the electoral process:

1. Inability of some reporters, journalists and program makers to understand the important determinants and features of the legal and political environment of the elections seemed apparent in mixing between the individual system's candidates and the independent candidates by some journalists, also mixing between political parties' candidates competing on the individual seats and candidates included in the parties' electoral lists, and also some reporters seemed unaware with the rules of the media coverage of the elections.
2. Interference of the capital in directing the media to support or criticize specific political currents to serve the entity provided the money.
3. Disrespect of the silent period.

4. Using women as a tool to gain the support or to attack some political currents which negatively affected the media coverage.
5. Exaggerated focus on the sectarian dimension in the electoral process, which in fact became one of the reason for increasing sectarianism.
6. Attempts to affect the public opinion through researches and surveys and announcing expectations, which affect the voting process
7. The low professionalism in the coverage of the religious channels of the elections, and their violation of all the rules for media coverage of the elections.
8. Concentration of the media on the exciting sides more than explaining the programs in the coverage of the elections.

The administrative judiciary system's performance in the elections:

Administrative judiciary system is considered a basic part in the electoral process, because it is specialized in considering the appeals which are filed during the elections.

The following is a presentation of the role of the administrative judiciary system in the parliamentary elections 2011/2012:

The appeals that were filed to the administrative judiciary system during the elections reached 2012 appeal case, decisions on 458 appeals were issued and the other appeals were transferred to the commissioners, and documents of 100 appeals were not presented,

and lack of jurisdiction verdict was issued on 284 appeals, and 160 appeals were not considered.

The most important trends of the verdicts of the administrative judiciary system during the elections:

1. Historical verdicts: The administrative judiciary system issued two historical verdicts:

One is stating the right of the Egyptians abroad to vote, and this verdict was activated, and the Egyptians practiced this right for the first time in the history of Egypt, and the other verdict allowed those who are temporary detained and those who are serving a sentence for non moral crimes to vote in the election.

2. Permanent deprivation from becoming a member in the parliament for those who escaped from the military service.
3. Non-eligibility of candidates to contest in the elections if they didn't fulfill the nomination conditions especially the not having a double personality condition.
4. Refusal of all the appeals in regard with acts of sovereignty.
5. Refusal of the demands to deactivate the decision of announcing the results.
6. The right of the candidate to obtain a copy of the voters list.
7. Refusal of the appeals demanding the invalidity of announcing the results.

Civil society organizations' Performance in monitoring the elections:

The role of civil society organizations in monitoring all types of election for the past 20 years gave them a great experience in this field, and although hundreds of organizations applied requests to monitor the election, but the Supreme Committee for Election responded in the last minutes and put many administrative obstacles in their way, but despite that these organizations succeeded in organizing a wide net of Field monitoring to cover all the voting committees in most of the governorates of Egypt, and in 2011 they conducted many workshops to train volunteers on monitoring the elections and provide them with all communication means that they might need to document the elections' steps. Many alliances were formed to monitor the elections and the most important one was the Egyptian Alliance for monitoring the elections which consists of 128 civil associations and organizations such as the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, Andalus Institute for Tolerance and Anti-violence studies, the Egyptian Center for Women's Rights and Magddon Association and United Group cooperated with them in preparing this final report on the elections, civil society organizations succeeded in documenting the positive and negative practices and the impact of these practices on the electoral process. The following shows some of these practices:

1. Violations of the entities supervising the elections: Many violations were documented such as the delay in opening the doors of the voting committees, the absence of conducting many

conditions that ensure the correct voting, lack of the phosphorus ink, preventing the candidates representatives from entering the committees, prevent civil society organizations representatives from monitoring the process, the absence of the judiciary supervision, not confirming the identity of the voters and trying to affect the voters decisions.

2. Violations of the candidates: Advertising during the silence period, spreading money on voters and committing violent actions

Women position in the parliamentary elections:

Civil society organizations also followed women's position in the elections as candidates or voters, and this position is considered as a very important development in the monitoring way because it helped in transforming these organizations activity from the general monitoring to focus on an important issue which is the women participation in the elections.

These organizations noticed deterioration in the women position in the parliamentary elections 2011, because many modifications were formed on the regulating the elections – especially the political rights law and the law of the parliament and Shoura Council, these modifications canceled the percentage of the parliamentary seats (quota) that was allocated for women and was replaced by an article in the law forcing the political parties to put a name of one woman in each party's list without determining the woman position on the list. A

report prepared by The Egyptian Center for Women's Rights stated some indicators that shows the actual women position in the election:

The first indicator:

The number of the female candidates reached 984 for the first time since women entered the political life in 1956, 633 candidates were nominated on the political parties lists and 351 candidates were competing on the individual seats, and the number of women who had the right to vote reached 23.500.000 voters, and women participated massively in the voting process of the parliamentary elections.

The second indicator:

The south governorates were supportive to women, and this was noticeable in the elevation of women nomination in the south governorates.

The third indicator:

Almost all the political powers had the same attitude towards women.

The fourth indicator:

Women faced a powerful competition on the individual seats with huge political powers that had a great fund which was used in the electoral publicity, also women face obstacles in facing other popular candidates who appears a lot on televisions

The fifth indicator: Women paid for the weakness in supervision and the power of law.

Election monitoring from a qualitative perspective for the first time in the Middle East is considered as an important positive development in the electoral process.

The role of civil society organization in evaluating the media coverage of elections:

Civil society organizations played a very good role in evaluating the media performance in covering the elections.

And they came out with the following results:

- The private newspapers seemed scared to admit the success of the SCAF and were insisted on ensuring their revolutionary attitude.
- The private channels were similar to private newspapers and tried also to ensure their revolutionary attitude and supporting Tahrir square.
- The role of the capital appeared prominently in the media coverage of the elections.
- The media did not support specific party as it used to do before, and that empowered the balance and neutrality in the coverage of the elections.
- Many media means exceeded the advertising limits with no supervision on the advertising expenses and punishment of those who violated the law.

- Clear violation of the silent period in most of the media.
- Huge violations in “the new media” which was used by some people in deforming facts and spreading rumors on some of the candidates and political parties.

Elections results and assessment of the electoral process:

- The total number of candidates reached 8415, 4847 of them was competing on the individual seats and 3566 were on the political parties’ lists.
- The nominations of the electoral alliances: Democratic alliance 498 candidates, Egyptian mass alliance 332 candidates, the revolution is continued alliance 330 candidates.
- Results of the elections: 21 political parties are represented in the parliament with 70% for all the religious parties and the other 30% is divided between Liberal, National, Leftist parties and independent candidates.
- As for the results that the electoral alliances achieved:
 - Democratic Alliance: 228 seats
 - Salafist Parties Alliance: 127 seats
 - Egyptian Mass Alliance: 34 seats
 - The Revolution is Continued Alliance: 8 seats.

General assessment and basic notes on the electoral process:

1. It was noticeable that a major part of the youth who organized and achieved the 25th of Jan. revolution did not participate in

the elections due to lack of confidence and ideologies and also the psychological gap which separate those activists from the organized political work. And most probably the lack in representing the youth in the Parliament and other political organizations will have a negative effect on the country in the next period of time.

2. Conduction of the election did not occur according to a clear map that all the political powers agreed on after Mubarak's fall, or a map which the SCAF succeeded to put, but the elections came out in the atmosphere of violent political struggles.
3. The elections were conducted in a bad political atmosphere due to the volatile political situation in the country.
4. The violent political accidents affected negatively on the stage of electoral campaigns especially the one before the first electoral stage. And the participants did not have a good opportunity to present their programs and ideas.
5. Elections were conducted on the background of division and deep political polarization between the political forces, especially between Islamic and liberal parties.
6. Elections were conducted in a very bad atmosphere such as dramatic deterioration in the public dialogue and conflicts between different political forces, especially when these political conflicts were transformed to a dispute over religious beliefs.

7. Despite all the negative political circumstances, the Parliamentary elections witnessed a wide range of participation according to the Supreme Committee for Elections reports.
8. It was also noticeable that the parliamentary election witnessed decrease in the violent accidents, and most probably this encouraged the voters to participate in the elections.
9. The organization of the parliamentary elections was not perfect, but it expressed the political and ideological moods that were in Egypt in this time.
10. The parliamentary elections did not come out with a solution to women, Christians and youth representation cases.

Part III

Elections future in Egypt

Towards Free and Fair elections.

Recommendations and suggestions:

By showing the parliamentary elections and all the negative practices that accompanied it, all this ensure our need to take several measures to avoid these negativities and to provide the necessary conditions that will ensure the integrity of the elections that will empower the democratic development in Egypt. The following are the most important recommendations and suggestions that might help in improving the electoral process and the law organizing this process:

1. The Supreme Committee for Elections

The elections showed that the Supreme Committee for Elections was not able to fulfill all the demands of managing the electoral process in addition to many mistakes and defects in the performance of the Committee, but the Committee does not responsible for the elections negativities alone there are other factors too such as rushing the elections, bad preparation and planning of the electoral process, the weak management and political and cultural atmosphere, and all these negativities should direct every entity involved in this process to reconsider the political rights law, which regulates elections in Egypt, and edit it to make it ensure the following:

- Reconsidering the formation of the Committee and making it permanent so that its experience will increase after each round, and the new Committee should have members experienced in law, politics and media also not only judges, and the complete judicial supervision should not be a condition to avoid dividing the elections to many stages.
- Increasing the jurisdiction of the Committee to ensure its management of the electoral process in all the stages with increased efficiency.
- Providing the financial and human resources for the Committee to enable its actual supervision over the elections (headquarters, employees and communication methods).
- Empowering the authority of the Committee over the state entities related to elections.
- Providing sufficient abilities for the Committee to play its role in determining the voting committees and choosing the employees staff assigned for the election, and do not leave this process to the Ministry of Interior as happened in this elections.
- Giving the Committee the authority to issue orders to the police forces assigned to secure the elections to ensure its ability to catch anyone who violates the electoral process's rules and to protect the voting committees.
- Facilitating the communication channels between the Committee and heads of general committees and sub-committees to overcome the obstacles which they are facing.

The electoral system:

- Conducting elections with relative list system for all seats and that will grantee the right of the political parties and independent candidates to form lists includes only members of political parties or only independent candidates or both.
- Conducting the elections in one day.

2. Procedures to improve the electoral process:

- The Supreme Committee for Elections should issue the decisions to invite the voters and determine the timetable for the elections and the rules regulating it in a suitable time before the beginning of the elections to avoid the confusion that occurred during this election due to the delay in issuing those decisions.
- Delivering election papers to voting committee one day before the elections and organizing the presence of the members of each committee inside it before the Election Day to ensure that the voting process will start on time.
- Activating the Supreme Committee for Elections' decisions to stop electoral advertising two days before voting, and it should use its authorities to prevent the continuation of the candidates in the publicity inside the voting committees' headquarters and around it to ensure that there will be no impact on voters.
- Reviewing the expenses of election campaign for each candidate and punishing anyone with a campaign exceeding the maximum coast of advertising.

- Conducting the process of sorting the electoral cards inside the voting committees headquarters with the presence of candidates representatives and announcing the results and hand over a copy of the results to the candidates representatives, the process of collecting results must be conducted in the Sorting General Committee, and prevent anyone who doesn't have the right to enter the Committee from entering.
- Preventing the assignment of employees from the same governorate in the voting committees.
- Preparing a database with the names of government employees in the different governorates and determining lists from this database to be assigned into the voting committees in general and local elections, and organizing training courses for them on the work that they should do during the elections to make sure that they are qualified to do their work without any mistakes.
- Providing the phosphorus ink in sufficient quantities for all the voting committees.
- Allocating a woman in each voting committee to confirm the identity of veiled women voters, and revising the database of the voters to remove the repeated names.

3. Women status in the elections:

- Forcing the electoral lists to put a woman's name within the first four sites.
- Studying the legal system of the elections and its impact on women participation.

- Inviting the political parties to increase women membership and training them to carry leadership responsibilities within the party to develop their leadership abilities as a preparation for expanding the nomination of women in the coming elections.

4. The role of the media in the elections:

- Reconsidering the ownership of the media (National newspapers – Television- Radio) by the state, and reorganizing the governmental media in an independent frame that achieves the ownership of media by society through independent entities representing all ideological, cultural and political trends.
- Training journalists and media personnel to raise their professional abilities on covering the elections, and to avoid the mistakes in the media coverage for the last elections.
- Determining the area allocated for candidates in the governmental media by the Supreme Committee for Election in a way that insure justice and equality.
- Application of the law on anyone who will violate electoral advertising rules.
- Preventing electoral advertisement in front of the voting committees in the electoral silence period.
- Application of the law on anyone who will use religious slogans or use worship houses in his electoral campaign.
- Punishing any media mean which will try to impact on the public opinion through researches or surveys and provide results and expectations that will affect the voting process.

The role of civil society organizations in the elections:

There is an article in the law that ensures the right of civil society organization to monitor the elections inside and outside the electoral commission, and the role of the Supreme Committee for Elections is limited to organizing the practice of this right without any complications that might prevent civil society organizations from doing their job perfectly, also the Supreme Committee for Elections must issue the permits for the civil society organizations to monitor the elections early before the beginning of the elections to give these organizations enough time and the opportunity to be prepared.



The Egyptian Coalition consists of 148 associations in 22 different Egyptian governorates, such as the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, Andalus Institute for Tolerance and anti-Violence Studies and the Egyptian Center for Women Rights; they all worked together in monitoring the elections.

The Coalition's main goals were:

1. Assessment of the electoral process in an independent and objective way.
2. Encourage citizens to participate to build the confidence between the voters and the electoral process.
3. Ensure the validity of the electoral process.
4. Participation in the development of the electoral process through observing and learning from the current elections.



United Group



European Union



Egyptian Organization
for Human Rights

United Group

26A Sherif St., Emobilia building El Borg El Bahri, 2nd Floor, Flat : 239, 221 Cairo - Egypt

Tel. : (+202) 23926907 - 23961732 - 23961726 Fax : 23952304

E-mail : info@ug-law.com Website: www.ug-law.com